National Reconciliation (continued)
[28. Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.
29. Provincial elections. Provincial elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary to restore representative government.
30. Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg.
A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New Diplomatic Offensive.
31. Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding ways and mean to reconcile with bitter enemies.
32. Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.
33. Civil society. the Iraqi government should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference.
Steps for the U.S. to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation
34. The question of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success.
35. The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.
36. The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation.
37. Iraqi amnesty proposals must mot be undercut in Washington by either the Executive or the Legislative branch.
Militias and National Reconciliation
38. The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
39. The United States should provide financial and technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members.
Security and Military Forces
40. The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.
41. The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned deployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes.
America's other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.
42. We should seek to complete the training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.
43. Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism operations.
44. The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level.
The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.
45. The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.
Restoring the U.S. Military
46. The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, but also to the President and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
47. As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States, in order to "reset" the force and restore the U.S.military to a high level of readiness of global contingencies.
48. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficint funds to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next five years.
49. The administration,in full consultation with the relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.
Police and Criminal Justice
50. The entire Iraqi National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.
51. The entire Iraqi Border Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total responsibility for border control and external security.
