The Wider Regional Context (continued)
14. This effort should include--as soon as possible--the unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the Quartet (i.e. the United States, Russia, European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria on one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledged Israel's right to exist) on the other.
The purpose of these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks--one Syrian/Lebanese, and the Palestinian.
15. Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace should be:
i. Syria's full adherence to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.
ii. Syria's cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
iii. A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (this step would do much to solve Israel's problem with Hezbollah.)
iv. Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.
v. A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.
vi. A verifiable cessation of arms shipments for or transmitting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.
16. In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border; including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.
17. Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peace should include:
i. Adherence to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.
ii. Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for negotiations with Israel.
iii. A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.
iv. Support for a Palestinian national unity government.
v. Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President bush's two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements in Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.
Afghanistan
18. It is critical for the United States to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.
B. THE INTERNAL APPROACH: HELPING IRAQIS HELP THEMSELVES
Performance on Milestones
19. The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones.
In public diplomacy, the President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi people, and the countries in the region well informed.
20. If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.
21. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
22. The President should state that the United States does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that request as it would in the case of any other government.
23. The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq's oil.
24. the contemplated completion dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first quarter of 2007.
25. These milestones (as indicated) are a good start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.
National Reconciliation
26. Constitution review. Review of the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.
27. De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime excluded.
The United States should encourage the return of qualified Iraqi professionals--Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkman or Christian or Arab--into the government.
